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Cities, Violence and Order: 
The Challenges and Complex 
Taxonomy of Security Provision in 
Cities of Tomorrow*
Jaideep Gupte with Stephen Commins
Abstract How will security in cities be understood in the future? For whom 
will it be provided? What are the ways by which urban security provision 
will be governed? And, what impact will violence and order in cities have 
on the processes of state-building in fragile contexts in the future? This 
article reports on a foresight study that addresses these questions. A key 
finding is that there are multiple and overlapping forms of urban violence, 
and the ways these interact have important consequences for understanding 
order in future cities.
Keywords: cities, urban, violence, foresight.
1 Introduction
Cities are not only critical nodes of  governance in the global North 
and South, but also play a ‘critical role in the processes of  state 
consolidation, transformation and erosion’ (Beall, Goodfellow and 
Rodgers 2013: 1). Indeed, as Tilly (2010) argued, the changing 
relationships between cities and states can help us understand the 
centrality of  cities in such processes.
At the same time, the state is no longer regarded as the sole or 
uncontested provider of  security in cities. This is due to two key 
advances in knowledge around, firstly, how cities as a unit of  
government grew to be distinct from the nation state that is weakened 
in an ever-globalised world (see for example Schiller and Fouron 2003). 
As Friedman argues: ‘[T]he focality of  the state in identity formation 
is giving way to competing identities from indigenous, regional, and 
migratory populations. The latter has also entailed a decentralisation 
of  resources within the state… and an increasing division of  powers, 
between the state as the representative of  the nation and the subgroups 
that tend to displace it’ (Friedman 2003: 8).
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Secondly, the state is viewed as one of  several actors centrally involved 
in the processes and actions that produce and mitigate violence 
(see for example Punch 2012), alongside local, non-state and other 
sovereign groups (Muggah 2014, 2015b). In parsing out the nature 
of  state violence, the focus has therefore shifted away from a singular 
understanding of  the role of  the nation state, and moved towards 
processes of  governance (Nugent 2004) and multiple sovereignties 
(Rodgers 2006) that come together to produce outcomes of  security and 
insecurity. In turn, the diverse types of  violent encounters so produced 
only bear a superficial connection with the structures of  the nation state, 
but instead, play out in the everyday (even intimate) spaces in the city 
(Datta 2012).
The most complex of  these relationships are invariably playing out in 
the cities of  low- and middle-income countries (Muggah 2015a), where 
most of  the urban population growth in the coming three decades is set 
to take place (United Nations 2014). It is in these contexts that everyday 
lived experiences of  violence undermine the confidence of  citizens in 
government systems, directly and indirectly have a negative impact on 
livelihoods, and frequently reduce the quality and quantity of  service 
provision. Though these impacts are varied and often characterised as 
hyper-local, they do collectively shape wider discussions on governance 
and state fragility at the national scale (Commins 2010).
When it comes to the subtleties of  addressing the concerns of  how 
security will be provided in cities in the future, however, there has 
been a lack of  thinking beyond simplistic doomsday scenarios or 
utopian projections. This is reflected in what are arguably simplistic 
understandings of  order, governance and control in cities of  the 
developing world.
At one end of  this continuum are ‘feral cities’ (Norton 2010), 
characterised by a complete failure of  the state to maintain the rule of  
law, thereby being overrun by all-subsuming slums (Davis 2006). As a 
result of  their collective failures, state apparatuses at both the city and 
national levels are viewed in a non-distinguishable manner. They are 
contrasted only with a paradoxical balance between on the one hand 
informal institutions that control the city, and on the other, the greater 
international systems, such as trade and communications, that continue 
unabated to connect with the city (Bunker and Sullivan 2011). At the 
other end of  this spectrum are ‘charter cities’ (Romer 2014). Romer 
describes these as monolithic entities, newly created to be free of  the 
vested interests and inefficient rules and bureaucracies that hinder 
security, growth and development.
Aside from the two extreme characterisations, pertinent questions 
around how security in cities will be understood in the future, how 
and for whom it will be provided, and how it will be governed, remain 
largely unanswered. A growing body of  evidence showcases the 
heterogeneity of  security processes and outcomes, both within and 
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between cities (Gupte, Justino and Tranchant 2014). Notwithstanding 
these recent advances, contemporary paradigms of  urban development 
do not substantively account for the ways in which the social, political, 
economic and physical aspects of  urban form interact and shape the 
mechanics of  security provision in cities. Part of  this gap is due to the 
separation between development theory or urban planning on the one 
hand, and issues of  security, conflict and violence on the other. These 
have usually been different intellectual and programmatic domains, to 
the detriment of  a coherent approach to either analysis of  insecurity or 
effective approaches to security provision.
This has left a perceptible gap in development policy, compromising the 
manner in which we respond to urban challenges today.
2 Research questions and study design
This study was driven by three main research questions:
1 What might the challenges of  security provision in cities look like in 
the future?
2 How can development policy and practice pre-emptively respond 
today?
3 What types of  programmes should be given greater priority and 
support in the future?
The study design is illustrated in Figure 1, and included review of  the 
relevant literature and of  relevant programmes, policies and interventions 
in a selection of  cities. These reviews were conducted iteratively, fed off 
one another and informed the futures workshop. Following the futures 
workshop, a series of  consultations with key informants (KI), stakeholders 
and experts were conducted, in order to help ground the workshop 
findings in current stakeholder and donor priorities.
Figure 1 Design of cities, violence and order study
Literature review
Cityscapes now (case studies)
KI/stakeholder/expert consultations
KI/stakeholder/expert consultations
KI/stakeholder/expert consultations
Futures workshop
STEEP analysis 
Drivers of change 
Cityscapes 2040
Review of 
programmes, policies, 
interventions
Source Authors’ own.
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For the foresight workshop, a group of  urban experts and leading 
thinkers representing a broad range of  disciplinary perspectives gathered 
to identify what the drivers of  violence and order in cities might be in 
the near future. The discussion was systematised through the ‘STEEP’ 
– social, technological, economic, environmental and political (see 
Figure 4) – framework so as not to reduce the drivers to a simplistic value 
judgement, i.e. ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ or ‘positive’ versus ‘negative’. Instead, 
the drivers of  change are represented as slider-scales that can be adjusted 
to postulate how the processes of  change might function in cities in the 
future. The list of  drivers can be fine-tuned depending on local contexts.
These foresight techniques are not meant to predict the future. Rather, 
they produce potential characterisations of  future cities that can be used as 
heuristic tools to help consider the nature of  challenges in the future, and 
the types of  policy response, both today and in the future, that these might 
necessitate. This material is then supplemented with expert consultations 
across a wide range of  donors, practitioners and academic experts to 
identify key biases and blind spots in research, policy and practice.
3 Dimensions of urban form relevant for futures thinking on cities, 
violence and order
The workshop adapted a scenario-planning process with the twin aims 
of  ‘characterising what the challenges of  security provision in cities 
might look like in 2040’ and ‘formulating ideas on how development 
policy and practice can pre-emptively respond today’. The process 
was designed to generate a set of  narrative scenarios of  the city in the 
future, referred to throughout the process as ‘cityscapes’. Shocks and 
stresses could be laid over these cityscapes to ‘test’ their resilience. The 
resilience testing process would reveal weaknesses in the social, political 
and economic structure of  the cityscape. Near-term development policy 
and practice interventions could then be designed to address these 
weaknesses and mitigate future impact.
For the purposes of  this study, we conceptualised ‘violence’ and ‘order’ 
in cities as being functions of  three interconnected dimensions (D) of  
the urban form:
D1 Grid – focusing on city spaces, their layout and planning, as shaped 
by economic, political, technological, social and gendered factors.
D2 Governance – focusing on the processes and structures that form 
the institutions through which people are excluded and included; 
sociopolitical voice and participation versus marginality and exclusion; 
willingness and capacity of  state actors.
D3 Ephemerality – focusing on the shifting dynamics and identities of  
violence that are often related to the grid and governance of  the city, 
but not reducible to them.
These dimensions were conceptualised such that cities may display 
different configurations, with one or two of  the dimensions dominating 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 4 September 2016: ‘Foresight in International Development’ 119–136 | 123
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
depending on local, temporal or spatial contexts. In the illustration 
above, the three dimensions of  urban form are shown to have elements 
that are unique to each dimension, as well as elements that fall within 
the overlap of  two, or all three, dimensions. It is important, however, to 
acknowledge upfront that this three-way articulation was not envisioned 
to be an exhaustive description of  the urban form, and was used 
more as a heuristic tool to widen the group’s thinking, rather than as a 
framework to limit the scope of  discussions.
Indeed, several alternate castings are plausible, including one that is 
interpreted through the dimensions of  Infrastructure–Governance–Contingency, 
or around Planning–Policing–Possibilities, for example, or castings that 
use fewer or more dimensions. The point of  such a heuristic tool is not 
only to systematise thinking about cities into the various dimensions, 
but importantly to push us to focus on the overlaps of  two, or more, 
dimensions. For example, the organisational set-up of  municipalities 
would pertain to the governance dimension (D2), while the role of  
non-state actors in the provision of  essential services such as water or 
neighbourhood policing would be placed in the overlap of  the governance 
and ephemerality dimensions (D2 ∩ D3). As another example, elements 
of  the city master plan, such as zoning demarcations (hawker zones, for 
instance) would be placed in the grid dimension (D1), but multiple or 
shifting uses of  public spaces (street markets during the day, places of  
congregation or prayer in the evening, for instance) would be placed at 
the intersection of  the grid and ephemerality dimensions (D1 ∩ D3).
Based on this typology, ‘violence’ and ‘order’ in the city are placed at 
the intersection of  all three dimensions (D1 ∩ D2 ∩ D3). Doing so 
Figure 2 Three dimensions of urban form – violence and order (V & O) in cities are 
a function of D1 (Grid), D2 (Governance) and D3 (Ephemerality)
Source Authors’ own.
GovernanceEphemerality
Grid
V & O
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recognises that both ‘violent’ and ‘ordered’ outcomes in cities result 
from varying combinations of  elements in each of  the three dimensions. 
We will therefore use this typology to identify the elements pertaining 
to each dimension for the issues we focus on. For example, ‘everyday 
violence’ in cities could be broken into the elements shown in Figure 3.
4 Key trends
There is good reason for cities to be described as the ‘new frontier’ for 
international development (DFID 2010). Nearly two thirds of  the global 
population of  9.1 billion in 2050 is projected to be urban. This implies 
a doubling of  the global urban population from 3.3 billion currently, to 
6 billion in 2050 (United Nations 2014). While approximately half  the 
world’s urban population live in smaller towns, our focus in this study is 
maintained on the larger urban agglomerations, as well as the smaller 
towns that are projected to grow to host more than 500,000 residents. 
These growing towns and cities are key as markers for policy and 
programming interventions on violence mitigation.
We find that while some of  these growing agglomerations, such as Juba 
(South Sudan) or Buenaventura (Colombia), are already beginning 
to feature in the research agendas on violence and order, others 
such as Lubango (Angola), Herat (Afghanistan), Pokhara (Nepal) or 
Muzaffarpur (India), however, continue to be relatively hidden from 
international view. Nevertheless, these are all locations where there are 
growing concerns over violence and order, ranging from the increasing 
presence of  gang and criminal activity in Pokhara, violent evictions in 
Lubango, to social unrest and mob violence in Muzaffarpur.
Figure 3 Theorising the interactions between urban forms and everyday violence 
Source Authors’ own.
Everyday 
violence
Governance: 
provision and 
management of essential 
services (by state and 
private-sector providers); 
state policing (e.g. arms 
and munitions control, 
training, strategies); 
inclusion of most at-risk, 
marginalised groups
Grid: planning of essential 
services (e.g. street lighting, 
accessibility, layout); policing  
(e.g. number of personnel  
per capita, crime rates)
Ephemerality: 
provision and  
management of essential 
services (by non-state  
actors); changing nature  
of secure/insecure spaces  
(e.g. by day/night; for  
women/men); policing/ 
security/control (by  
non-state actors)
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Violence in both urban and rural contexts is a serious threat to human 
security (UN-Habitat 2007), and disproportionately impacts those who 
are already poor and marginalised (Justino 2007). Recent research 
points to the increasingly urban geography of  violence (Buhaug and 
Urdal 2013; Raleigh 2015). This moves us beyond thinking of  urban 
violence only as a periodic segment of  war that is otherwise a rural 
phenomenon. When the violence of  war does spill into urban areas, it 
is invariably indicative of  changing strength ratios between rebels and 
government (see for example Holtermann 2014). We also know that 
violence against civilians during civil wars now occurs predominantly in 
urban areas (Raleigh 2012).
However, the types of  violence associated with war or armed conflict are 
not the only significant modalities of  urban violence. The destructive 
impacts of  criminal and everyday violence can be more acute than 
traditional war – the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) finds that ‘by far the largest aspect of  the global burden of  
armed violence is the deaths and injuries that occur in non-conflict or 
non-war settings’ (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008: 67). Of  the 
31 most fragile and conflict-affected countries today, 23 are projected 
to be significantly urban in the near future. At the same time, fatalities 
due to armed violence in non-war settings far outweigh war-related 
deaths. Much of  this violence is centred in cities. Violence, therefore, is 
increasingly a defining characteristic of  urban living in both conflict and 
non-conflict settings.
An often-cited metric for death and victimisation in the city is homicide. 
According to the most recent data available, the 20 cities with the 
highest non-war-related homicide rates were predominantly in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, with a few from sub-Saharan Africa, 
North America and Central Asia also making the list. It is also the case 
that homicide rates tend to be higher in cities.
Not highlighted by these global trends are cities where the 
inconsistencies of  national crime records prevent global comparisons. 
One glaring omission in this regard is Karachi, Pakistan, where 
‘killings’ (not specifically defined as homicides) have dramatically 
increased over the past decade, and at the same time have come to be 
concentrated in a handful of  neighbourhoods. In absolute numbers of  
killings, Karachi rates among the most dangerous cities in the world 
(Hashim 2012). Another aspect not captured in the global comparisons 
of  the highest homicide rates, are emerging situations like that of  
India, where 43,355 intentional homicides were recorded in 2012 at a 
rate of  4.5 per 100,000 people (Gupte and Muggah 2015). Criminal 
violence generates at least ten times more deaths and injuries in India 
than terrorism and conflict. In this, a comparatively small number of  
intermediate and large cities register a disproportionate amount of  
gun violence: four of  the top five most violent cities in terms of  murder 
by firearms are located in Uttar Pradesh.1 The most violent cities are 
not mega-cities, but rather mid-sized cities of  between 1 million and 
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3 million people. These mid-sized cities continue to grow rapidly and 
feature disproportionately large populations of  unemployed and under-
educated youth. They are also exhibiting severely under-resourced 
services, including public police forces.
5 Foresighting cityscapes 2040
The cityscapes developed for this study were set in the 2040s, giving a 
25-year time horizon. This time period was chosen to reflect commonly 
used high-level planning horizons (in the United Kingdom) and to go 
sufficiently beyond the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 
20302 timeline so as to complement but not get completely diverted 
by the current debate. In addition, a 25-year time horizon is tangible 
enough for the participants to grapple with and relate to, yet far enough 
into the future for change to be quite dramatic.
Using the STEEP – social, technological, economic, environmental 
and political – framework, the opening session generated input on the 
key global trends and external forces driving change and impacting 
our societies, environments and cities. Five participants were invited to 
share short presentations identifying between three and five key trends 
or external forces that, from their perspective, are driving changes in 
violence and order now, or are emerging as drivers of  future change. 
The workshop facilitators recorded and mapped the drivers onto a 
wallchart depicting the city, its transactional environment and the 
external forces affecting the core (see Figure 4).
Drivers of  change identified by the group of  experts at the futures 
workshop were mapped according to the STEEP framework and 
Figure 4 The STEEP framework overlaid onto the city and its wider environment
Source Diagram developed for the workshop by Fran Seballos (IDS) and Alun 
Rhydderch (School of International Futures).
Transactional 
environment
External drivers
City environment
Economic
Environmental
Social
Political
Technological
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according to the environment from which the driver emerged – 
external, transactional or from the city itself. Due to the specialist nature 
of  the experts’ interventions, a plenary session was facilitated to explore 
drivers beyond the city context, which may affect how individuals, 
organisations, institutions and cities function and interact in the future.
The list was by no means meant to be exhaustive, but served as a platform 
on which the following futures thinking could be based. Populating the wall 
chart as described allowed the rapid clustering of  drivers under broader 
headings. The process generated nine broad clusters of  ‘drivers of  change’:
1  Population dynamics
2  Authoritative control of  urban space
3  Changing meaning of  cities and urban living
4  Environment and resource scarcity
5  Changing economies
6  Movement (flows) of  people
7  Technological innovation
8  Complexity of  governance structures
9  Political economy of  land, (illegal) commodities and services.
The nine clusters were then visualised as ‘slider-scales’. In 
conceptualising these slider-scales, care was taken so as to not reduce 
any one to a simplistic value judgement – i.e. ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ or 
‘positive’ versus ‘negative’. Instead, the ends of  each scale signified 
Figure 5 Potential drivers of change characterising future cities
Source Authors’ own.
Linear/incremental change
Increasingly virtual interaction
Recession
Dispersed
Differentiated
Inclusive
Thriving
Low/mild impacts
Rapid/disruptive change
Interactions through 
physical contact
Growth
Centralised
Rapid population growth
Exclusionary
Static/maturing/possibly in 
decline
Extreme/frequent impacts
Technological challenge
Technology and social interactions
Global economy
Political power
Demographic change
Access to services
Meanings of the city
Climate change
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a nuanced calibration (to maximum or zero effect) of  the drivers of  
change within that cluster of  drivers of  change.
Two scales for the Technological Innovations cluster were 
conceptualised: (1) ranging from being predominantly linear and 
incremental in nature, to being rapid and disruptive; and (2) as being 
reliant on increasingly virtual interactions to being reliant on interactions 
through physical contact. Figure 5 shows a visual representation.
From these eight slider-scales, each of  four groups was allowed to select 
between two and four spectrums to provide a framework for their future 
cityscape. This was a departure from the usual process of  scenario 
development that is premised on the selection of  two ‘high impact: high 
uncertainty’ scales which are overlaid to create a quadrant giving four 
potential scenarios.
In building the cityscape frameworks, the groups had to identify which 
end of  the scale would be shaping the city, and in order to avoid group 
bias, they had to select one driver and use the opposite end of  the 
spectrum to that which they intuitively felt would be more likely. This 
rule was instigated to stop the groups building cityscapes that were 
overly influenced by their preconceptions of  what a future city may look 
like, and to ensure that a range of  future possibilities was fully explored.
Groups were then referred to the ‘three dimensions of  urban form’ – grid, 
ephemerality and governance – as a point of  reference for describing and 
articulating the interactions and dynamics between the STEEP drivers, as 
framed by each group’s chosen spectrum extremes. To help visualise the 
cityscapes, each group was encouraged to either select a known city, or 
name and locate their city – for example, a coastal city in southern Asia. 
For this workshop, this provided important context for considering issues 
such as the availability of  land for expansion, or the types of  climate 
impacts that may be experienced – for example, sea-level rise.
Once the cityscape narratives were fleshed out, the groups were 
also asked to consider the impact of  three kinds of  unmitigated and 
exogenous shocks and stresses on the interactions and dynamics 
between the actors, spaces and institutions, i.e. the worst case within the 
context of  their cityscape. The shocks and stresses were:
 l S1 Everyday insecurities – this includes those insecurities and 
vulnerabilities which do not threaten the state per se but nevertheless 
form the everyday lived experiences of  city-dwellers.
 l S2 Violence, uprisings and armed conflict – this includes protracted 
conflicts that are increasingly located in and around cities, or even if  
they are not, often have the control of  cities as their objective.
 l S3 Climate change and disasters – this includes the many small 
disasters, i.e. fires, landslides, local floods, waste flows, not just the 
headline ones.
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 4 September 2016: ‘Foresight in International Development’ 119–136 | 129
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Thinking through the unmitigated impact of  such shocks and stresses led 
to the identification of  weaknesses in the cityscapes’ systems, institutions 
and interactions – or conversely to their strengths. Considering both 
the weaknesses and strengths, each cityscape group then took up the 
challenge of  designing interventions – policy or programmatic – that 
would mitigate (in the case of  weaknesses) or ensure management of  (in 
the case of  strengths) the shocks and stresses identified.
To show how the slider-scales might be operationalised, the following 
sub-sections present excerpts from two cityscapes as examples (see 
Gupta with Cummins 2016 for complete versions). The cityscapes are 
developed using various calibrations of  drivers of  change as markers. 
Potential policy responses, and how these might interact with the future 
city, are then identified.
Cityscape 2040: ‘Coastal collapse’3
A coastal Chinese city with a population of  10 million and a broader 
urban region of  20 million making a poly-centric, export-dominated, 
special economic zone. In 2015, it was still a successful exporter of  ‘white 
goods’ – for example, fridges, washing machines, microwaves and other 
manufactured goods to the European and North American markets. It 
had developed very fast from 1995 to 2015, but by 2040 there are serious 
signs of  strain on the economic and social model on which the city’s 
development and prosperity had depended. The city is located on the 
coast where there is a container port (which was modern in 2015, but 
will fall on harder times due to a decline in export demand), and there is 
a river. Expansion to the megalopolis of  30 million people will be rapid 
and not constrained by any geographic features (like mountain ranges). 
The main constraints will therefore be the ‘workableness’ of  the urban 
region – distance, traffic, commuting times and so on. Given that the city 
is located on the flood plain with a low-lying river delta, flooding and 
sea-level rise have been greater challenges.
Three drivers of  change were used to create this cityscape. 
Recession
Global economy 
Growth
Impact of  slider-scale calibration: By 2040, there was a general and 
local recession caused by a shift in large-scale manufacturing out of  
China. There was still limited demand for the type of  goods produced 
in the Chinese market as the middle class had developed (2015–35) but 
for the last five years (2035–40) even here demand slowed. Much of  the 
basic manufacture and assembly for these goods was now done in other 
Asian and African countries.
Some of  the entrepreneurial and managerial staff were able to emigrate 
and work in Africa in supervisory, planning, IT and managerial posts for 
the kind of  firms which had been producing previously in the city region. 
In a return flow of  migration, some foreign traders and a few people 
with specialist skills came from abroad to live and work in the city.
♦
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There are a lot fewer formal sector jobs. In rural areas, the informal 
development has been accepted. The situation is less clear-cut in the cities.
Dispersed
Political power 
Centralised
Impact of  slider-scale calibration: By 2040, the Chinese political system 
had evolved, but not fundamentally altered. The Chinese Communist 
Party was still in control, but the difficulties in the economy and 
previous experience with the devolution of  some decision-making 
autonomy to city level meant that (successful) local experiments were 
welcomed. Unsuccessful experiments adversely affected career chances 
for local officials and managers – leading in extreme cases to disgrace, 
demotion and/or relocation. But so did continued inadequate economic 
performance in the city and signs of  public discontent. Citizens’ interest 
groups could organise around local issues of  service delivery, economic 
performance, and issues such as the efficiency and cleanliness of  the 
city, housing, etc. They did not have to be under Party control but were 
still not allowed to challenge the system or threaten its ‘stability’ (order) 
as defined by the Party. To do so could trigger direct reprisals and police 
intervention – even with force – for example, clearing streets by police 
action if  a demonstration ‘got out of  hand’.
The coordinated pressure for better services on the one hand, and the 
comprehensive use of  electronic surveillance technologies on the other, 
mean that there is now permanent potential for conflict. There is a 
danger that the middle class may become more insistent that the state 
should ‘get a grip’ and impose more order.
Linear/
incremental 
change
Technological change Rapid/disruptive 
change
Impact of  slider-scale calibration: The period 2025–35 revolutionised the 
industrial base of  the city. Computerised, robotised and fully automated 
production processes replaced the need for less skilled labour working in 
assembly for instance. The manufacturing process was mainly centred 
on carbon compounds and new materials, not metal. 3D printing largely 
replaced the need for transport of  components and assembly. Finished 
items were much smaller and lighter. In many cases software transfer 
meant that customers could have their items locally produced in ‘3D 
print warehouses’. This meant that the large factory buildings were 
mainly standing idle – but some were adapted to other uses – broken 
up into small units used for product design, such as 3D print shops of  
various kinds and centres for manufacturing green energy technologies.
The new technology inevitably meant that there will be winners and 
losers – the main losers are likely to be lower-skilled workers and those 
working in transport.
What might be the policy response to increased tensions and violence in 
this cityscape? First, the strong citizen response to the floods, coupled with 
♦
♦
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a more responsive attitude by the authorities, creates new possibilities of  
a stronger coalition between the authorities and the wider population. 
The poorer sections of  the population insist on no evictions and no 
victimisation for those involved in activism – particularly the squatters’ 
movement. The ‘no empty space’ movement is a citizen-led coalition 
campaigning for any empty housing to be made available and for factory 
space to be used at advantageous rates for business, community groups, 
self-help training initiatives and so on. The community is also providing 
labour at subsistence wages to build up the sea defences to provide a new 
protective barrier for the poorer residential areas. The city is providing 
the rocks and cement to make this possible. Street vendors’ organisations 
succeed in their campaign for a more progressive policy and indoor space 
for regularisation of  their status. A liaison group between the traders and 
the city and police negotiates a resolution of  almost all areas of  friction in 
a tolerable and mutually acceptable way.
Second, the precarious stand-off between the authorities and certain 
sections of  the population continues. Occasional victimisation of  
prominent activists, such as leaders of  the street vendors or squatters, 
continues. Periodic ‘crackdowns’ lead to confrontation between police 
and local youth – sometimes with violence and counter-violence. 
Groups do not achieve any wider solidarity, each group has to ‘fight its 
own corner’ – leading to contestation over services and mistrust and 
competitiveness between different initiatives. There is some voluntary 
work and patchy philanthropic initiatives. The port is still functioning, 
but is of  diminishing economic importance. Within the wider city area 
(the 30-million conurbation) some new small enterprises emerge and 
some ‘urban farm’ ventures develop on a small-scale cooperative model.
Finally, the downward spiral continues. The ‘Chinese Detroit’ scenario 
threatens. City finances are non-viable – the city is effectively bankrupt 
and the state is not keen to bail it out or provide a rescue package. 
Policing and services are – step by step, without a deliberate policy or 
announcement – gradually withdrawn from the poor areas. The poorer 
sections of  the population are left to fend for themselves and these areas 
of  the city become effectively ‘no go’ areas for officials and outsiders 
from the residential areas which are not so hard hit.
Cityscape 2040: ‘Post-capital commons’4
This cityscape was built using a contemporary non-coastal Indian city as 
a starting point.
Low/mild 
impacts
Climate change Extreme/
frequent 
impacts
Impact of  slider-scale calibration: Climate variability is thought to be 
highly disruptive, with serious conditions of  flooding and high levels 
of  out-of-season rainfall interspersed with heat stresses getting more 
frequent and intense with time. However, as the city itself  is not coastal, 
the climate-related shocks and stresses are perceived as ‘happening 
♦
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elsewhere’. As a result, risk management is not highly systematised 
across the city. Most efforts towards building resilience are mainstream 
and ‘off-the-shelf ’ approaches.
Differentiated 
Demographic change
 
Rapid 
population 
growth
Impact of  slider-scale calibration: The population can be described by 
extreme demographic differentiation and accompanied by a reduction 
in family sizes. A change in gender dynamics is perceptively evident 
with women more likely to work, given the need for dual incomes across 
most households. Smaller family units also imply fewer elderly parents 
are able to live in the same home – this marked transformation in 
domestic space is significantly different from rural settings, where larger 
households are more common.
Linear/
incremental 
change
Technological change Rapid/disruptive 
change
Impact of  slider-scale calibration: The city is envisaged as being shaped 
by new technologies that are disruptive to the status quo. In particular, 3D 
printing technologies have rapidly developed and revolutionised two sectors. 
Firstly, new building technologies have replaced bricks and mortar with 
3D printed materials. The technology has become widespread through 
middle- and upper-income neighbourhoods, where residents have been 
able to readily afford the expensive raw materials required to switch to this 
technology. Low-income neighbourhoods continue to use low-grade non-
permanent materials. The regulatory environment has been unable to cope 
with the ‘democratisation’ of  building technology, and this has inevitably 
led to a greater degree of  non-conformity with building regulations. Recent 
government efforts have been aimed at regulating the design files, while 
building regulations need to be enforced through code inspectors.
Second, small arms manufacturing has switched almost completely to 
using 3D printing. The open-source nature of  the design files has led to 
widespread gun ownership among civilians in all walks of  life. Control 
of  ammunition is one of  the few remaining state controls of  firearm use.
Recession
Global economy 
Growth
A collapsing dollar has triggered the Chinese to demand repayment 
of  their debt. As a result, a new Bretton Woods system has emerged 
that sets up a global consensus that the reconstruction of  spaces and 
economies is in the collective interest, and directs money towards such 
efforts. Though cities become less important, this, however, does not 
exacerbate intra-urban inequalities. A group of  global leaders articulate 
a different way of  generating and allocating resources that ‘ensure the 
public good’ across countries and across cities.
♦
♦
♦
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What might be the policy response to increased tensions and violence 
in this cityscape? First, the nature of  governance structures in the city 
imply that the burden of  risk management cannot be placed on any 
one single scale, but is spread across local and national actors. Investing 
in a strong evidence base early is important, as is the need to empower 
communities with access to this evidence. Substantial resources need to 
be diverted towards re-imagining the conceptual frameworks used to 
understand ‘refugees’ and ‘internally displaced’. As people get displaced 
from one city and seek refuge in another, city-based citizenship becomes 
a contested topic that requires support from research funding.
Second, technology regulation systems are key to maintaining order 
and control; however, there are differential impacts across the city. 
Innovators in design and usage of  new materials are thought-leaders 
and key influencers – so development interventions need to focus on 
including them in the process of  change. Gender dimensions continue 
to be central, not only for the differential impact of  violence, but also 
due to the gendered nature of  the relationships people have with 
technological innovations. Interventions therefore need to focus on 
creating space for both women and men to be leading innovators.
6 Conclusions
Using foresight methods, we find that there is a continuing need for 
donors to invest in more evidence-gathering and to undertake more 
detailed research on the interplay between violence and order in cities. 
This includes maintaining focus on different typologies of  violence. 
Violence might occur ‘upon cities’ (as in cities coming under siege). 
But it might also occur ‘within cities’ (where violence is located in urban 
settings, but almost by circumstance), or it may be ‘inherent to cities’ 
(where the type and modalities of  violence are specifically urban in 
nature; and even become ingrained in the everyday fabric of  urban 
life). The three levels are deeply interconnected (through cross-cutting 
themes of  gender, for instance), but they present significantly different 
challenges in terms of  entry points for violence mitigation strategies.
Another important conclusion is that ‘ordered cities’ are often 
synonymised with ‘planned’, ‘smart’, or even ‘charter’ cities. Misconceived 
planning, policy, or design interventions are likely to create insecurity, not 
reduce it. Urban order can also be repressive and exclusionary, and these 
processes can occur over very long periods of  time. As such, ‘order for 
whom?’ is the operative question that significantly impacts outcomes. In 
this sense, there is a critical gap in our understanding of  the lessons that 
the safest cities provide us in terms of  systems thinking – as opposed to 
violence preventing innovations in unsafe cities.
Both national and local governments, as well as donors and other 
stakeholders, need to rethink their tools and analytical frameworks 
to assess whether the lived experiences of  urban violence are being 
adequately taken into account. This should also extend to research, 
policy design and programme implementation. Using ‘foresighting’ can 
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help identify urban futures that are possible, probable and preferable. As 
heuristic tools, these future scenario-planning approaches are useful in 
helping to assess the nature of  future challenges, and the types of  policy 
response, both today and in the future, that these might necessitate.
The futures thinking presented in this study is relevant for mega-
cities such as Mumbai and Rio de Janeiro as they continue to change, 
but importantly also for smaller towns and cities that are projected 
to host more than 500,000 residents, particularly in fragile and 
conflict-affected countries. In either setting, experience shows that an 
approach to ‘get the economy right first’, or even focusing too much 
on national institutions of  government, without giving attention to 
local government, might create social and political fissures and create 
violence in cities. Institutional conditions and governance arrangements 
are such that they tend to exacerbate processes of  marginalisation, 
unless that is, issues of  inclusion are explicitly placed on the table.
In terms of  violence mitigation, there are tangible differences between 
‘political settlements’ and ‘peace processes’ – in many ways, the former 
is static and non-transformative, while the latter is more geared towards 
the fluid future of  cities. As we have noted, crime and violence statistics 
are useful proxy indicators of  everyday violence and fragility in cities 
because they represent social stress, failures of  state systems/legitimacy, 
and may create deeper processes beyond specific numbers (i.e. fear of  
taking certain bus lines, visiting certain neighbourhoods, or mistrust of  
other ethnic, religious and political groups).
But everyday violence and fragility also goes beyond simple statistics 
of  violence to include the ungoverned or non-state governed spaces 
that they can represent. It also includes the destabilising factors that 
urban pressure can bring to national politics, and the positive element 
that this might have on forcing greater accountability on political elites. 
One commentator refers to ‘pirate’ cities in regard to how citizens have 
created their own service systems, while another has referred to the 
‘self  service’ state.5 Both reflect the ways in which governance failures 
have an impact on local communities. The complex nature of  the 
overlap between urban and national fragility is, however, a pressing issue 
at a national and international scale as well.
Notes
* This article draws on Gupte, J. with Commins, S. (2016) Cities, Violence 
and Order: The Challenges and Complex Taxonomy of  Security Provision in Cities 
of  Tomorrow, IDS Evidence Report 175, Brighton: IDS.
1 Interview with Rajan Medhekar, Director Gender (Retd.), National 
Security Guard, India.
2 For more details, see: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/
post2015/transformingourworld.
3 Group notes contributed by Roger Williamson.
4 Group notes contributed by Eric Kasper.
5 Garth Myers, written communication.
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